Technical Library | 2011-09-26 13:53:30.0
On September 14, 2010, the late Shannon Wren, owner of VisionTech Components ("VisionTech"), and Stephanie McCloskey, VisionTech's Administrative Manager, were arrested during the execution of search and seizure warrants issued against the pair by the United States government after evidence connected them to the sale of counterfeit parts to the U.S. Navy, defense contractors and others. A ten-count indictment charged McCloskey with conspiracy, aiding and abetting in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 371 and 2; trafficking in counterfeit goods, in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 2320; and mail fraud, in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1341. McCloskey pled guilty to conspiracy and aiding and abetting for her role in the scheme.
Technical Library | 2021-10-12 18:05:09.0
The remarkable increase in counterfeit parts (a factor of 4 since 2009) [1] is a huge reliability and security concern in various industries ranging from automotive electronics to sensitive military applications increasing the possibility of premature failure in critical systems [2-5]. Counterfeit parts can also incur a great financial loss to legitimate electronics companies [6]. The issue is even more alarming as the counterfeiters use more sophisticated methods making counterfeit detection a much harder task [7-8]. Therefore, it is reasonable to develop more advanced counterfeit detection methods targeting a more efficient detection of sophisticated counterfeited parts.
Technical Library | 2022-10-04 16:54:38.0
Counterfeiting is growing in exponential proportions with respect to the types of: • Products being counterfeited • Industries affected • Potential consequences caused by counterfeits If this threat is not adequately addressed, counterfeit items have the potential to seriously compromise the safety and operational effectiveness of our products. The objective of this training is to raise awareness of: • The risks and impacts of counterfeit parts infiltrating the supply chain. • Best practices to eliminate or mitigate those risks • Lockheed Martin counterfeit prevention requirements for suppliers
Technical Library | 2014-02-20 15:59:17.0
In this chapter, we discuss the type of parts used to create counterfeits and the defects/degradations inherent in these parts due to the nature of the sources they come from, proposed inspection standards, and limitations of these standards. The processes used to modify the packaging of these parts to create counterfeits are then discussed along with the traces left behind from each of the processes. We then present a systematic methodology for detecting signs of possible part modifications to determine the risk of a part or part lot being counterfeit.
Technical Library | 2014-09-04 17:43:19.0
The counterfeiting of electronic components has become a major challenge in the 21st century. The electronic component supply chain has been greatly affected by widespread counterfeit incidents. A specialized service of testing, detection, and avoidance must be created to tackle the worldwide outbreak of counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs). So far, there are standards and programs in place for outlining the testing, documenting, and reporting procedures. However, there is not yet enough research addressing the detection and avoidance of such counterfeit parts. In this paper we will present, in detail, all types of counterfeits, the defects present in them, and their detection methods. We will then describe the challenges to implementing these test methods and to their effectiveness. We will present several anti-counterfeit measures to prevent this widespread counterfeiting, and we also consider the effectiveness and limitations of these anti-counterfeiting techniques.
Technical Library | 2022-10-04 16:43:10.0
In this paper I will discuss the different methods and equipment used to detect counterfeit electronic parts, specifically integrated circuits as well as demonstrate some of the "red flags" that help to identify a part as being suspected counterfeit. We will begin with the initial receipt of the parts and the examination of the outer packaging, the basic visual inspection of the parts, the visual inspection and documentation at high magnification, permanency marking, blacktop test, scrape test, XRF (RoHS), decapsulation, X-ray, basic electrical testing, C-SAM, full function testing and limited function testing.
Technical Library | 2012-03-08 20:08:57.0
You may have heard talk in the news lately regarding counterfeit electronic components making it into the US military supply chain. The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) recently reported in the Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Defense Department Supply Chain hearing held on November 17, 2011, 1,800 cases of suspected counterfeit components that went into more than 1 million individual products. If you consider this number for the military, we can only imagine the number of counterfeits in our commercial yet high reliability products, such as life support or other critical systems. If you are the person within your electronics-based company who must perform risk analyses, counterfeiting is not a new concern, yet many do not realize just how good counterfeiters have become at their "trade".
Technical Library | 2018-09-12 21:04:28.0
Counterfeit electronic components are finding their way into today’s defense electronics. The problem gets even more complex when procuring DMS (diminishing manufacturing source) parts. This paper will provide a brief introduction to counterfeit prevention and detection standards, particularly as they relate to the Aerospace and Defense sector. An analysis of industry information on the types and nature of counterfeit components will be discussed in order to illustrate those most likely to be counterfeited, followed a specific case at a major defense contractor.
Technical Library | 2018-01-04 11:05:34.0
Traceability has grown from being a specialized need for certain safety critical segments of the industry, to now being a recognized value-add tool for the industry as a whole. The perception of traceability data collection however persists as being a burden that may provide value only when the most rare and disastrous of events take place. Disparate standards have evolved in the industry, mainly dictated by large OEM companies in the market create confusion, as a multitude of requirements and definitions proliferate. The intent of the IPC-1782 project is to bring the whole principle and perception of traceability up to date. Traceability, as defined in this standard will represent the most effective quality tool available, becoming an intrinsic part of best practice operations, with the encouragement of automated data collection from existing manufacturing systems, integrating quality, reliability, predictive (routine, preventative, and corrective) maintenance, throughput, manufacturing, engineering and supply-chain data, reducing cost of ownership as well as ensuring timeliness and accuracy all the way from a finished product back through to the initial materials and granular attributes about the processes along the way.
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